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Constitutional Law-Invalidating Statutes
on Hypothetical Facts
A parking lot attendant drove a customer to her place of
business, and, while returning the automobile to the parking lot,
negligently struck the plaintiff, a pedestrian, who successfully recovered against the customer under the following Georgia statute:
Every owner of a motor vehicle . . . shall be liable ... for injuries . . . :resulting from negligence in the operation of such motor
vehicle if . . . used in the prosecution of the business (or) for the
benefit of such owner.

On appeal, Held: the statute violates due process because it might
impose liability upon an owner whose automobile was operated
without his consent or knowledge, express or implied. Frankel v.
Cone, 214 Ga. 733, 107 S.E.2d 819 (1959) .1
Van Antwerp v. Horan, 390 ID. 449, 61 N.E.2d 358 (1945); Eder v.
Rothamel, 202 Md. 189, 95 A.2d 860 (1952); 14 MD. L. REV. 151 (1954);
Cf. Annot., £7 A.L.R.2d 999 (1959).
7 Campbell v. Drozdowics, 243 Wis. 354, 10 N.W.2d 158 (1943), held
that a husband's voluntary conveyance of his interest to land to
his wife which they held in joint tenancy destroyed joint tenancy
for all practical purposes including right of survivorship.
s See 34 NEB. L. REV. 293 (1954).

6

1

Noted in 10 MERCER L. REV. 338 (1959).
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A statute is invalid if it makes an owner absolutely liable for
the negligence of a thief, 2 but this statute did not reach that far.
It is very difficult to imagine a thief operating a stolen automobile
for the owner's benefit, or in the prosecution of the owner's business.3
On the other hand, statutes imposing liability upon a car
owner whose car is operated with his permission have been uniformly upheld. 4 In a leading case,5 a resident of New Jersey
loaned his automobile to another who drove to New York and
there injured the plaintiff. Recovery was granted against the
owner in a New Jersey court under a New York statute which
predicated liability on the owner's permission, express or implied.
The United States Supreme Court affirmed. 6
In the instant case the element of permission is present, yet
the court struck down the statute as applied to a thief situation
when the statute obviously did not reach it. Unfortunately, the
court is not alone in this practice of invalidating statutes on hypothetical facts.
The Delaware court, for example, invalidated the Non-Resident
Motor Vehicle Act because it might allow the state to notify a
non-resident that process "will soon be made" on the Secretary of
State even though the non-resident then before the court had
been notified of process actually served. 7 North Carolina struck
down a tax statute because it might allow property to be re-valued
without notice to owners in spite of the fact that notice had been
This would be liability without fault; however the area of such liability is growing. An owner may be lb.eld absolutely liable where his
automobile is parked in violation of a city ordinance, Commonwealth
v. Ober, 286 Mass. 25, 189 N.E. 601 (1934). An owner may be held
absolutely liable if he leaves the keys in ignition, Ross v. Hartman,
139 F.2d 14 (D.C. Cir. 1943). Florida has declared the automobile a
"dangerous instrumentality,'' Lynch v. Walker, 159 Fla. 188, 31 So.2d
268 (1947), see note, 5 U. FLA. L. REV. 412 (1952). See also PROSSER, TORTS, § 61 (2d ed. 1955).
a Of course, one might argue that the owner benefited if his car were
stolen, and seconds later a plane crashed where the car had been.
4 See cases cited in 5A AM. JUR. Automobiles § 612 (1956). The liability of an automobile owner for tlb.e negligence of third persons is discussed in 61 A.L.R. 867 (1929) and 53 A.L.R.2d 679 (1957).
u Masci v. Young, 109 N.J.L. 453, 162 Atl. 623 (1932).
6 Young v. Masci, 289 U.S. 253 (1933), noted in 47 HARV. L. REV. 349
(1933), 18 MINN. L. REV. 350 (1933), and 12 TEX. L. REV. 87 (1933).
7 Castelline v. Goldfine Truck Rental Serv., 48 Del. 550, 107 A.2d 915
(1954), rev'd on other grounds, 49 Del. 155, 112 A.2d 840 (1955).
2
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published in the local newspaper. "Whether future boards would
be so kind is not certain." 8
Most courts refuse to indulge in this type of reasoning. For
instance, a Connecticut court had before it a statute which imposed
liability on a liquor vendor for any damage done by an intoxicated
buyer. The court admitted that a vendor might be liable in a
case where the damage and the intoxicatioh had no causal connection, but such a possibility would not be considered when the
facts did not require it. 9
The Nebraska cases, however, appear to adopt the practice
illustrated by the Georgia, Delaware, and North Carolina cases
above. 10 In State v. Pocras, 11 for example, the Nebraska Supreme
Court invalidated an obscenity statute because the phrase "dispose
of in any manner" might allow one to be imprisoned for turning
obscene literature over to the police although no such situation
was before the court. 12
This Nebraska tendency, and the instant case, accordingly
raise a question concerning the constitutionality of a recent Nebraska statute: 13
The owner of .any leased truck . . . shall be jointly and severally
liable with the lessee and the operator thereof for any injury . . .
resulting from the operation.

If Nebraska continues its tendency to consider statutes in light

of what might be done under them, this statute by the reasoning

s Bowie v. Town of West Jefferson, 231 N.C. 408, 57 S.E.2d 369 ( 1950).
Additional cases decided on hypothetical facts, Kentucky Alcoholic
Beverage Control Bd. v. Jacobs, 269 S.W.2d 189 (Ky. 1954), Buchanan
v. Health, 210 Ga. 410, 80 S.E.2d 393 (1954), and Demers v. P·eterson,
197 Ore. 466, 254 P.2d 213 (1952).
9

Pierce v. A1lbanese, 144 Conn. 241, 129 A.2d ·606 (1957). See cases cited
in 16 C.J.S. Constitutional Law § 97 at 349 (1956). The United States
Supreme Court has had trouble in this area, see notes, 31 NOTRE
DAME LAW. 684 (1956), and 40 CORNELL L. Q. 195 (1955). An excellant symposium on statutory construction is found in 3 V AND. L. REV.
365 (1950).

10

"It may be said that this is not the situation presented by the facts in
this case, but it must be xemembered th.at the validity of the act does
not depend upon what has been done, but upon what the act authorizes and by what may be accomplished under it." Peter Kiewit Sons'
Co. v. County 'of Douglas, 161 Neb. 93, 104, 72 N.W.2d 415, 423 (1955).

11
12

166 Neb. 642, 90 N.W.2d 263 (1958).
See dissent, ibid.

13

NEB. REV. STAT. § 39-7,135 (Supp. 1957).
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in the instant case may be found unconstitutional. 14 However, this
tendency should not be continued. The court should return to
an application of each statute to the actual facts of the case, leaving interesting hypotheticals for the future.
Richard E. Gee '62

